§38. But what, for example, is the word "this" the name of in language-game
(8) or the word "that" in the ostensive definition "that is called...."?—If you
do not want to produce confusion you will do best not to call these words names
at all.—Yet, strange to say, the word "this" has been called the only genuine
name; so that anything else we call a name was one only in an inexact,
This queer conception springs from a tendency to sublime the logic of our language—as one might put it. The proper answer to it is: we call very different things "names"; the word "name" is used to characterize many different kinds of use of a word, related to one another in many different ways;—but the kind of use that "this" has is not among them. 
It is quite true that, in giving an ostensive definition for instance, we often point to the object named and say the name. And similarly, in giving an ostensive definition for instance, we say the word "this" while pointing to a thing. And also the word "this" and a name often occupy the same position in a sentence. But it is precisely characteristic of a name that it is defined by means of the demonstrative expression "That is N" (or "That is called 'N'").  But do we also give the definitions: "That is called 'this'", or "This is called 'this'"? 
This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.—And you really get such a queer connexion when the philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object. And we can also say the word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"—a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy.