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OTHER  VIEWS ON METAMETHODOLOGY

Newton-Smith (1981) provides an analysis along our lines.  He distinguishes showing that physicists were acting 'rationally in general', given the full set of their aims, beliefs, and - perhaps - human nature, from showing that they were acting 'rationally qua scientist' (p.251).  He remarks that most human behaviour is 'rational in general' and that this is not of much interest.  He repeatedly emphasises that a philosopher of physics must take social and psychological factors seriously, not just ignore them or deny them; at the same time he insists (p.263-4) that a central strand of 'rational qua scientist' behaviour can be identified.  He makes clear (p.252 and 271-2) that decisions are rational relative to A and T, and that A always need a social-psychological explanation. 

Toulmin (1970) p.44:  "A new theory (of the nature of physics) ... will tend to bring the logic of science closer together with its sociology and psychology".


Lakatos (1970) p.140 footnote 3:  "The history of science cannot be fully understood without mob psychology". (p.138) We can criticize "the actual history for lack of rationality".